1.1. The Need for Updating¶
Updating an embedded system is always a crucial step during the life cycle of an embedded hardware product. Updates are important to either fix system bugs, solve security problems or simply for adding new features to a platform.
As embedded hardware often is placed in locations that make it difficult or costly to gain access to the board itself, an update must be performed unattended; for example either by plugging in a special USB stick or by some network roll-out strategy.
Updating an embedded system is risky; an update might be incompatible, a procedure crashes, the underlying storage fails with a write error, or someone accidentally switches the power off, etc. All this may occur but should not lead to having an unbootable hardware at the end.
Another point besides safe upgrades are security considerations. You would like to prevent that someone unauthorized is able to load modified firmware onto the system.
1.2. What is RAUC?¶
RAUC is a lightweight update client that runs on your embedded device and reliably controls the procedure of updating your device with a new firmware revision. RAUC is also the tool on your host system that lets you create, inspect and modify update artifacts for your device.
The decision to design was made after having worked on several custom update solutions for different projects again and again while always facing different issues and unexpected quirks and pitfalls that were not taken into consideration before.
Thus, the aim of RAUC is to provide a well-proven, solid and generic base for the different custom requirements and restrictions an update concept for a specfic platform must deal with.
When designing the RAUC update tool, all of these requirements were taken into consideration. In the following, we provide a short overview of basic concepts, principles and solutions RAUC provides for updating an embedded system.
1.3. Key Features of RAUC¶
- Fail-Safe & Atomic:
- An update may be interrupted at any point without breaking the running system.
- Update compatibility check
- Cryptographic signing and verification of updates using OpenSSL (signatures based on x.509 certificates)
- Flexible and customizable redundancy/storage setup
- Symmetric setup (Root-FS A & B)
- Asymmetric setup (recovery & normal)
- Application partition, Data Partitions, ...
- Allows grouping of multiple slots (rootfs, appfs) as update targets
- Supports common bootloaders
- Storage support:
- ext2/3/4 filesystem
- UBI volumes
- raw NAND (using nandwrite)
- Independent from updates source
- USB Stick
- Software provisioning server (e.g. Hawkbit)
- Controllable via D-Bus interface
- Supports Data migration
- Network protocol support using libcurl (https, http, ftp, ssh, ...)
- Several layers of update customization
- Update-specific extensions (hooks)
- System-specific extensions (handlers)
- fully custom update script
- Yocto support in meta-rauc
1.4. Redundant Updates¶
Being able to safely update an entire system with pre-defined images normally requires more than one bootable device or partition available. A minimal setup would consist of a running system on slot A and an inactive system on slot B. A bootloader is responsible for booting the desired system.
Now, the running system may perform an update on the inactive slot B. Once the update was performed successfully, the system must tell the bootloader to boot from slot B from now on. To add more safety, a third bootable slot C may be used containing a minimal fall-back system the bootloader may choose if booting from the other slots fails. This one might also be used to initially install a production system on a new device.
In the following an overview of the basic concept RAUC uses for realizing such an update system is provided.
RAUC’s view of the target system it is running on is described using so-called slots. Slots are possible targets for (parts of) updates. Usually, they are partitions on an SD/eMMC, UBI volumes on NAND/NOR flash or raw block devices. The system designer must provide a configuration file that lists all slots that RAUC should use and describe which device they are stored on, how the bootloader may detect them, etc.
An update bundle is a squashfs-packed set of config files, scripts, and disk images with an appended signature that allows verifying the bundle’s origin and integrity.
To determine from which slot the system is booted, the bootloader must provide a boot chooser. This allows maintaining multiple boot sources with a defined priority, a number of boot attempts, and a flag to deactivate the source.
If booting from the highest-priority system (typically the current production system) fails for e.g. 3 times, the next lower priority boot source is chosen (which could be the fallback system).
As updates are always installed in a currently inactive slot, the boot priority must be changed after a successful update.
1.8. Basic Update Procedure¶
The RAUC service that runs on the target will perform an update when being triggered by an install command providing an update bundle. An update request may be initiated manually from the command line, via D-Bus or by a script that checks for example for insertion of an USB stick containing a firmware bundle. Then the default (and simplified) update behavior will be the following:
- RAUC verifies the bundle by checking its signature against the keyring located in the root file system. A bundle with an invalid signature will be rejected.
- RAUC mounts the bundle (which simply is a squashfs image)
- Verify bundle compatibility:
- The compatible string in the manifest is compared against the compatible string stored in the system configuration file.
- If the strings are different, the bundle will be rejected to prevent installing an incompatible bundle.
- Determine the target install group, i.e. which slots an update will be installed to.
- Mark target slots as non-bootable for bootloader.
- Iterate over each image specified in the manifest
- Try to read slot status informations.
- If the provided slot image is different from the installed one: Update slot with a method determined by the type of slot and the image type.
- Try to write slot status informations.
- Mark target slots as new primary boot source for the bootloader.
- Terminate successfully if no error occurred.
Once the update controller receives an update request instruction containing the file path of a firmware bundle it verifies its signature based on a public key stored in the current rootfs. If the signature is valid, the service loopback-mounts the bundle to access its content and installs the update.
Installing the update means either calling an update handler included in the bundle (if provided) or using a default handler that performs the update based on information about the available slots and versions.
1.9. Target Slot Selection¶
The boot chooser (in the bootloader) passes the name of the booted slot using the kernel command line. This allows the controller to identify the currently active slots.
To select the target slot, the controller first looks for a slot marked as non-bootable. This could be caused by an interrupted update or repeated boot failures.
If no non-bootable slot exists, the inactive slot with the lowest priority is selected.